Furthermore, the agreement groups the agents who comprise the group into a plural subject. Each member is assumed to have at least some knowledge of all of the plans and sub-plans for the actions taken by the group.
For example, consider his example of two people who intend to paint a house together. He classifies relevant action types according to the ways and degrees with which they require commitment to collectivity. Moreover, she argues that the account must avoid an inferential regress in the perception of the requisite mutual recognition.
Katinka Schulte-Ostermann contends that success in the theory of collective action requires that we either develop a better theory of individual agent causation or that we abandon the causalist approach to action. A paradigmatic social phenomenon: If we are aesthetic intentionalists, then the interpretation of collaboratively produced art seems to require us to conceive shared intention as more than the sum of the individual, I-mode intentions of the individual artists, since in many cases collaboratively produced art aims at producing affects that are not the intention of any of the artists involved.
Nikos Psarros argues that a certain broad class of theories of collective action rest upon a mistake: Nevertheless, in such cases we can be engaged in a joint activity with a shared intention. He rejects "the days of affectivity-free intentionality and intentionality-free-affectivity.
On the other hand, the members of the dance troupe run for cover as part of a preconceived routine. He thinks in terms of large collective agents, like universities, churches, and limited liability companies. However, according to Velleman, Gilbert does not explain how such a thing can be formed.
Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden[ edit ] Collective intentionality has also been approached in light of economic theories, including game theory. When speaking of a group, it becomes common to say "they" did whatever action the group is seen as doing. In combination these give a great overview of the omni-relevant views of Bratman, Gilbert, Pettit, and Searle, and they provide a strong sense of the relevant conceptual territory.
Every essay engages the relevant views of some or all of them.
He argues that we should look for the difference in non-intentional terms, i. Today they owe that status to their governments.
He proceeds to specify two criteria that must be satisfied by any proper account of collective intentionality:In the philosophy of mind, collective intentionality characterizes the intentionality that occurs when two or more individuals undertake a task together.
Examples include two individuals carrying a heavy table up a flight of stairs or dancing a tango. Concepts of Sharedness: Essays on Collective Intentionality, Ontos Verlag; Searle, John R. Concepts of Sharedness shows how rich and lively the philosophical research focused on the analysis of collective intentionality has become, and will provide further inspiration for future work in this rapidly evolving field.
Concepts of Sharedness Essays on Collective Intentionality. Ed. by Schmid, Hans Bernhard / Schulte-Ostermann, Katinka / Psarros, Nikos. On the Ontology of Collective Intentionality: A Constructivist Perspective. Saaristo, Antti.
Joint attention seems like a pre-condition of collective intention and, perhaps, the most basic case of collective intentionality. Empirical psychology suggests that joint attention is rudimentary and fundamental in the development of human cognition.
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