Kripke calls an expression a rigid designator if it refers to the same object in every possible world. In the debate with Norman Malcolm, Armstrong compared consciousness with proprioception.
However even so he should have admitted it in folk psychology and also in scientific psychology and biology generally, in which physics and chemistry are applied to explain generalisations rather than strict laws. However if we approach the two imitation peacocks and peer into them to note the precise shapes of the twigs that make them up we will find differences.
This is certainly giving preference to real chemistry over folk chemistry, and so far I applaud this.
On the epiphenomenalist picture, in addition to the normal physical laws of cause and effect there are psychophysical laws positing mental effects which do not by themselves function as causes for any observable behavior.
As remarked above, Place preferred to express the theory by the notion of constitution, whereas Smart preferred to make prominent the notion of identity as it occurs in the axioms of identity in logic. Otherwise, mental states would not be determined by physical states, a situation which contradicts the widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of mind " supervenience principle": An identity theorist would expect his toothache today to be very similar to his toothache yesterday.
New York University Press. Armstrong had been realist about colour but Smart worried that if so colour would be a very idiosyncratic and disjunctive concept, of no cosmic importance, of no interest to extraterrestrials for instance who had different visual systems.
Though this point of view has been criticised by some philosophers it does seem to be right, as can be seen if we consider a possible robot aeroplane designed to find its way from Melbourne to Sydney. Of course, as Smart recognised, this leaves the identity theory dependent on a physicalist account of colour.
Multiple Realizability In "The Nature of Mental States," Hilary Putnam introduced what is widely considered the most damaging objection to theories of Mind-Brain Type Identity—indeed, the objection which effectively retired such theories from their privileged position in modern debates concerning the relationship between mind and body.
The only thing an Identity Theory of this kind could tell us is that at least one of the mental disjuncts is capable of being realized by at least one of the physical disjuncts.
Reichenbach said that mental events can be identified by the corresponding stimuli and responses much as the possibly unknown internal state of a photo-electric cell can be identified by the stimulus light falling on it and response electric current flowing from it.
How many hairs must a bald man have no more of? Infinitely long disjunctions would render the identity claim completely uninformative. One is that the approach is able to allow for the causal interactions between brain states and processes themselves, as well as in the case of external stimuli and responses.
References and Further Reading 1.Identity theory is a family of views on the relationship between mind and body.
Type Identity theories hold that at least some types (or kinds, or classes) of mental states are, as a matter of contingent fact, literally identical with some types (or kinds, or classes) of brain states. The earliest.
- Identity Conditions for Indicator State Types within Dretske's Theory of Psychological Content Naturalization ABSTRACT: Within the context of Dretske’s theory of.
The Mind/Brain Identity Theory: A Critical Appraisal. Leslie Allan - manuscript details The materialist version of the mind/brain identity theory has met with considerable challenges from philosophers of mind.
In the Social Identity Theory, the self is reflexive in that it can take itself on as an object and can categorize, classify, or name itself in particular ways in relation to other social categories or classifications.
Online magazine featuring hundreds of interviews, original fiction and essays, plus blogs on music, social justice and film. Identity theory argues that the mind is identical to the brain and that mental events are identical to brain events, ultimately the theory enlightens.Download